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I. INTRODUCTION
Rooted in antiquity, the double jeopardy concept is "one of
the oldest ideas found in Western Civilization."' Historians do not
know its exact origin, but they have traced the concept to the days
of the Greeks2 and Romans. The idea of one trial and one punish-
ment survived even the turmoil of the Dark Ages, a period when
many principles of justice were overturned. When the Pilgrims fled
England, the double jeopardy concept sailed with them to the New
World5 and today it is incorporated into the United States Consti-
tution6 and also into the constitutions of all but five states.
1. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. "[TJhe laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue .... " 1 DE-
MOSTHENES 589 (J. Vince trans., 4th ed. 1970).
3. The Roman expression of the guarantee against double jeopardy is nemo debet bis
vexari pro una et eadem causa: "It is a rule of law, that a man shall not be twice vexed for
one and the same cause." H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS *241. The same maxim
applied to the plea of res judicata in civil cases.
4. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121, 152 & n.4 (Black, J., dissenting).
5. Comment, The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Defendant's Double Jeopardy
Interests in the 1977 Term, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 520 (1979).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause provides: "nor shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."
7. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 435 (1953). State constitutions that lack a
double jeopardy provision are: North Carolina, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and
Vermont. Id. Regardless of a state's constitutional provisions the double jeopardy clause
applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Benton v.
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Despite this noble history, no consistent line of case precedent
supports the guarantee against double jeopardy. As one writer
noted, "the riddle of double jeopardy stands out today as one of
the . . . most commonly misunderstood maxims in the law, the
passage of time having served in the main to burden it with confu-
sion upon confusion." The truth of that statement is reflected in
the double jeopardy decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In criticizing the Court's inability to alleviate the confusion in
double jeopardy jurisprudence, Justice Rehnquist recently admit-
ted that the Court's decisions are "replete with mea culpa's occa-
sioned by shifts in assumptions and emphasis."'
Amidst this sea of confusion, one truth has flashed repeatedly
as a beacon of consistency and clarity: Once a court has entered a
verdict of not guilty, the prosecution may not try the defendant
again for the same offense. The double jeopardy issues facing most
courts, however, rarely involve the simple prohibition against re-
trial after an acquittal. 10 Perhaps the most perplexing issue is
whether double jeopardy protection applies to situations of re-
versed convictions. The answer, as determined by the Supreme
Court in three leading cases, depends upon the basis of the rever-
sal. In United States v. Ball,1 the Court held that a reversal based
upon trial error does not prevent a retrial." Later, in Burks v.
United States,5 the Court held that a reversal based upon the suf-
ficiency of evidence is an absolute bar to reprosecution.14 Finally,
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
8. Note, Criminal Law - Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522, 522 (1940).
9. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. Double jeopardy protection applies to three situations. See North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). First, double jeopardy protects against a second trial after
acquittal. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). Second, it protects against a sec-
ond trial after conviction. See In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). Third, it protects against
multiple punishments. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). Unfortunately, in
attempting to solve double jeopardy issues, courts have at times erroneously cited examples
of one protection as authority for another. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla.
1979) (citing Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), a multiple prosecution case, as con-
trolling authority in deciding Pinder, a multiple punishment case).
11. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
12. Id. at 669.
13. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
14. Id. at 18. A companion case to Burks, Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), is also
cited for the proposition that cases reversed for insufficient evidence may not be re-
prosecuted. The Court's disposition of Greene, however, differed from its straightforward
holding in Burks. In Greene, two defendants were convicted of first-degree murder in a
Florida trial court. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the convictions were reversed
and new trials were ordered.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that Burks precluded a
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in Tibbs v. Florida,'5 the Court held that a reversal based upon the
weight of evidence, like a reversal based upon trial error, does not
prevent a retrial. 6
These cases have created three distinct categories of reversed
convictions-trial error, sufficiency of evidence and weight of evi-
dence. Differentiating the three categories is critical in determining
whether a defendant will be released or reprosecuted. Of particular
concern is the subtle distinction between the sufficiency and
weight of evidence. Despite its importance, the sufficiency-weight
distinction has baffled many courts.
The procedural history of Tibbs illustrates the complexity of
the courts' strugglewith the double jeopardy concept and the suffi-
ciency-weight distinction.'" In 1974, the State of Florida charged
Delbert Tibbs with the murder of Terry Milroy and the rape of
Cynthia Nadeau. 18 A jury convicted Tibbs of first-degree murder
and rape and sentenced him to death."'
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded"0 after finding severe weaknesses in the state's case.2
second trial after a reversal based on insufficient evidence. The Florida Supreme Court's
reversal, however, prevented the United States Supreme Court from applying the Burks rule
to bar another trial. The Court noted that the per curiam opinion of the Florida court was
based on insufficient evidence. Nevertheless, the Court was reluctant to apply the Burks
rule because the Florida court justices had qualified the per curiam opinion with special
concurrences that discussed only trial error. According to the Court, the Florida justices
may have been "concerned simply with trial error and joined in the remand solely to afford
[the defendants] a fair, error-free trial." 437 U.S. at 26. A reversal based on the concern for
an error-free trial would not have precluded a new trial. Id. The ambiguity of the Florida
court's holding prompted the court to remand to the court of appeals for reconsideration in
light of Burks. Id. at 26-27.
15. 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
16. Id. at 47.
17. See infra text accompanying note 33.
18. Tibbs v. State (Tibbs I), 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976). Milroy and Nadeau were
hitchhiking from St. Petersburg to Marathon, Florida on February 3, 1974, when a man
driving a green truck picked them up near Fort Myers. After traveling a short distance, the
man drove into a field, stopped the truck, and asked Milroy to help him siphon gas from
some farm machinery. Nadeau waited a few minutes, then stepped out and walked to the
rear of the truck where she saw the driver pointing a gun at Milroy. The gunman ordered
Nadeau to undress and shot Milroy in the shoulder. Despite Milroy's frantic pleas, the man
fired a second, and fatal, shot into Milroy's head. The killer then raped Nadeau. Id. at 789.
Afterwards, Nadeau was told to dress and get back into the truck. When they returned
to the highway, the killer ordered Nadeau to get out and walk in front of the truck. Once
outside, Nadeau turned the other way and ran. Frightened by an approaching vehicle, the
killer fled in the truck. That night, Nadeau gave the police a detailed description of the
killer and the truck. Police later arrested Tibbs because his appearance matched Nadeau's
description. Id. at 790.
19. Id. at 789.
20. Id. at 791.
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However, the court did not clarify its reversal in terms of the suffi-
ciency or weight of evidence.2 2 On remand, the trial court con-
cluded that retrial would violate the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution and dismissed the indictment.23 The
state then appealed to a Florida appellate court, which reversed
the dismissal and remanded for a new trial.24
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's de-
cision. This time, the court classified its earlier reversal as one
based upon the weight of evidence as opposed to the sufficiency of
evidence.2 5 Finally, on certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and
held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar reprosecution
after a conviction is reversed based upon the weight of evidence. 26
The Court's decision in Tibbs raises important questions
about the sufficiency-weight distinction and the concept of double
jeopardy. This comment will examine the validity of the "suffi-
ciency-weight distinction" and consider its impact within the judi-
cial system. An examination of the arguments raised in both the
majority and dissenting opinions of Tibbs follows a brief history of
the pertinent cases preceding Tibbs. An alternative analysis of the
sufficiency-weight distinction will be suggested, by tracing English
common law as it was adopted into American jurisprudence. Fi-
21. Id. at 790-91. The court enumerated the infirmities in the evidence: (1) No evi-
dence, other than Nadeau's testimony, placed Tibbs in or near Fort Myers on the day of the
crimes; (2) the truck allegedly driven by Tibbs was never found; (3) Tibbs did not have
possession of a gun or car keys when stopped by police; (4) Tibbs cooperated fully with the
police throughout their investigation; (5) the state introduced no evidence that cast doubt
upon Tibbs's veracity; and (6) several features of Nadeau's testimony cast doubt upon her
credibility as a witness. Id.
22. The court emphasized that because Delbert Tibbs's life was in jeopardy it had re-
viewed the facts - a function usually within the province of the jury. The court described
its obligation:
While the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses is ordi-
narily a matter which is exclusively within the province of the jury to decide,
and this court will as a rule not reverse a judgment based upon a verdict re-
turned by the jury and approved by the trial judge, when there is substantial
evidence to support the verdict rendered, it is also the rule that the evidence
relied on to have this effect must be substantial in character.
When such evidence is not substantial in character, this court is committed
to the rule that a conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered, where the
evidence relied on is not satisfactory to establish the identity of an accused as a
participant in a crime in which he has been found guilty.
337 So. 2d at 791 (quoting McNeil v. State, 104 Fla. 360, 139 So. 791 (1932)).
23. State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
24. Id. at 386.
25. Tibbs v. State (Tibbs II), 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
26. 457 U.S. at 47.
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nally, the author will analyze the elimination of "weight of evi-
dence" reversals in the Florida appellate courts.
II. THREE CATEGORIES OF REVERSED CONVICTIONS
A. Trial Error
The Court considered the applicability of the double jeopardy
principle to the first category of reversals-those based upon trial
error-in United States v. Ball.2 7 In Ball, the Court held that a
defendant may be retried after his conviction is reversed because
of trial error.2 8 In reaching its conclusion, the Court balanced the
defendant's interest in finality against the government's interest in
obtaining a conviction.2 '
Finality, for double jeopardy purposes, refers to a defendant's
right to "repose" 0 after judgment-the knowledge that the prose-
cution cannot initiate further action. The defendant's interest in
finality, however, is not absolute. It must be balanced against the
government's interest in reprosecution.3 After an acquittal, the
government's interest is weak, and therefore, the defendant's inter-
est must prevail. But after a reversed conviction based upon trial
error, the balance tips in favor of the government's interest in a
final determination of guilt or innocence. Justice Harlan articu-
lated the balancing theory in United States v. Tateo:32 "It would
be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused
granted immunity from punishment because of any defect suffi-
cient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to
conviction. ' ' 3
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
The Supreme Court dealt with the second category of rever-
sals-those based upon the sufficiency of evidence-in Burks v.
Unites States. " The Court held that a second trial is barred after
27. 163 U.S. at 662.
28. Id. at 672. In Ball, the Court stated for the first time that a verdict of acquittal is
an absolute bar to a subsequent indictment against the same defendant for the same of-
fense. Id. at 669.
29. Id. at 669.
30. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. See, Note, What is Double Jeopardy? No Clear Answer in United States v.
DiFrancesco, 1981 Dr. C.L. REv. 1147, 1156.
32. 377 U.S. 403 (1964).
33. Id. at 466.
34. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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an appellate court reverses a conviction because the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support a jury verdict of
guilty.35
In considering double jeopardy and the sufficiency of evidence,
the Court explicitly distinguished sufficiency of evidence from trial
error.,6 A reversal based upon trial error indicates that the judicial
process that led to conviction was in some way defective. 37 On the
contrary, a reversal based upon insufficient evidence does not re-
quire a new trial 8 because, in such a case, the government has
failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The double jeopardy clause, in this situation, forbids the prosecu-
tion to take a second bite of the apple."9
The Burks Court emphasized that the failure to recognize the
differences between trial error and sufficiency of evidence had cre-
ated much confusion: "[Clases which have arisen since Ball gener-
ally do not distinguish between reversals due to trial error and
those resulting from evidentiary insufficiency. We believe, however,
that the failure to make this distinction has contributed substan-
tially to the present state of conceptual confusion existing in this
area of the law."40
After Burks, the double jeopardy implications of two catego-
ries of appellate reversal became clear: Reversals based upon trial
error are remanded for a new trial, while reversals based upon in-
sufficient evidence carry the same finality as acquittals.4 1 Unfortu-
35. Id. at 18. Burks explicitly overruled Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
Burks, 437 U.S. at 2. In Bryan, the Court held that a reversal based upon the sufficiency of
evidence does not prevent a retrial. 338 U.S. at 560. The Bryan decision also implied that
there was no qualitative distinction between reversals based upon trial error and those
based upon insufficient evidence. Burks also overruled three other cases, Forman v. United
States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Sapir v. United
States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955), to the extent that they suggested that a defendant waives his
right to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new trial. 437 U.S. at 2.
36. 437 U.S. at 15.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 14-15.
41. One potential issue not resolved by Burks is how courts should decide cases where
trial error has contaminated the sufficiency of evidence. For example, suppose that a review-
ing court has reversed the conviction because it found that the trial court erroneously ad-
mitted incriminating evidence against the defendant. Since the reversal is based upon trial
error, one would expect that the court would be free to remand the case for a second trial.
But should the reviewing court be allowed to determine whether it was the erroneously-
admitted evidence which allowed the prosecution to meet the sufficiency of evidence test? If
the court reached such a conclusion, the double jeopardy interpretation in Burks would bar
a second trial.
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nately, the double jeopardy concept has proven too complex to be
so easily pigeonholed. A third category of reversal-the weight of
evidence-adds more confusion to the realm of double jeopardy
jurisprudence.
This final category arises when the evidence is technically suf-
ficient but its weight is so tenuous or insubstantial that a new trial
is ordered in the interest of justice. 2 Interestingly, the distinction
between a reversal based upon the sufficiency of evidence and one
based upon the weight of evidence was of no consequence until
Burks. Prior to Burks, a defendant could presumably be retried
under either category. The irony of Burks, therefore, is that in
resolving one confusing aspect of double jeopardy-the sufficiency-
trial error distinction-the Court simultaneously created another
area of confusion-the sufficiency-weight distinction.
C. Weight of Evidence
Tibbs v. Florida43 forced the Court to resolve the issue of
double jeopardy and reversals based upon the weight of evidence."
In a five to four decision," the Court held that the double jeopardy
clause does not bar retrial when a conviction is reversed based
upon the weight of evidence as opposed to the sufficiency of
evidence."
In analyzing the Tibbs decision, it is first necessary to distin-
guish between the "sufficiency of evidence" and the "weight of evi-
dence." Essentially, sufficiency of evidence is a test of quantity,
while weight of evidence is a test of quality. In determining suffi-
ciency, the court measures the adequacy of evidence; in determin-
ing weight, the court measures the probative value and credibility
of evidence. When an appellate tribunal, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, believes that the
prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
42. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
43. 457 U.S. at 31.
44. Courts have been reluctant to interpret this third category of reversal. In MacAr-
thur v. Nourse, the Florida Supreme Court noted, "[wle specifically decline to rule upon the
double jeopardy implications of appellate reversals based upon considerations of evidentiary
weight." 369 So. 2d 578, 581 n.11 (Fla. 1979). Similarly, in Greene v. Massey, the Supreme
Court of the United States was not "willing to express an opinion as to the double jeopardy
implications of a retrial ordered on [grounds of evidentiary weight]." 437 U.S. at 26 n.10.
45. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice White dissented, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
46. 457 U.S. at 47.
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the evidence is not legally sufficient to support a conviction.47 As
mentioned earlier, reversal of a conviction based upon the suffi-
ciency of evidence means. that the prosecution has failed to prove
its case, and the defendant is therefore acquitted. When the evi-
dence is technically sufficient but the appellate court concludes
that the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict, the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.4 After Tibbs, the
reversal of a conviction based upon evidentiary weight allows the
court to remand for a new trial.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUFFICIENCY-WEIGHT DISTINCTION
In reversing a conviction based upon a verdict contrary to the
weight of evidence, a court acts as a member of the jury, casting its
own vote. In Tibbs, Justice O'Connor analogized a reversal based
upon the weight of evidence to the situation of a deadlocked jury:
A reversal on this ground, unlike a reversal based on insufficient
evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper ver-
dict. Instead, the appellate court sits as a "thirteenth juror" and
disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony.
This difference of opinion no more signifies acquittal than does
a disagreement among the jurors themselves."9
Under prevailing notions of double jeopardy, if a jury is una-
ble to reach a unanimous decision, the court may grant a new
trial. 0 Thus, if the Tibbs analogy is accurate, a second trial should
also be permissible when an appellate court disagrees with the
jury's verdict. There is, however, a caveat to the application of the
"thirteenth juror" analogy since the standard for upsetting a jury
verdict is very strict. It has been argued that allowing the judge to
reverse a conviction based upon the weight of evidence permits the
judge to usurp a function traditionally within the province of the
jury. By invading the province of the jury, the judge then becomes
the real trier of fact. Recognizing this danger, courts must use cau-
tion when reweighing evidence. Accordingly, courts reversing a jury
47. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 n.4 (1946).
48. See United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
49. 457 U.S. at 42.
50. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978); United States v. Sanford,
429 U.S. 14, 16 (1976) (per curiam); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401-02 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963); Wade v. Hunter
336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71 (1902); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
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verdict based upon the weight of evidence couch their decisions in
terms of "exceptional cases," 5' "preventing injustice, '52 or the "evi-
dence preponderating heavily against the verdict."53
The dissent in Tibbs argued that there is no justification for a
retrial following a reversal that purports to prevent a serious mis-
carriage of justice. Justice White noted that if the evidence
presented in the first trial lacked the necessary weight to support a
conviction and the same evidence were presented on remand, one
must assume that the appellate court would again reverse any con-
viction that was based upon that evidence."' The second trial
would serve only to harass the defendant. This argument neglects
the possibility that the second trial may vary substantially from
the first. On retrial the prosecution might succeed in making its
case stronger. Or its case may be weaker;"5 the mere lapse of time
may lessen the strength of the state's case. Furthermore, "new evi-
dence may be available, old evidence may have disappeared, and
even the same evidence may appear in a different light if, for ex-
51. United States v. Pepe, 209 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Del. 1962), aff'd, 339 F.2d 264 (3d
Cir. 1964) (prosecution for alleged gambling violations where the defendant operated behind
a false store front, was an associate of known gamblers and had previously been convicted of
gambling charges is not an exceptional case justifying a reviewing court's finding that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence).
52. Unites States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 618 (D. Haw. 1949) (court found a mis-
carriage of justice where the defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder despite
well-trained psychiatrist's "persuasive testimony" in behalf of defendant).
53. Unites States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (D.C.D.C. 1947) (in prosecution for
robbery, the "evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict" of guilty where two other
men pleaded guilty to the same crime and also fully corroborated defendant's testimony).
54. 457 U.S. at 47-48. The dissent's argument is based upon the presumption that at
retrial the prosecution would submit the same evidence used in the first trial. If the defen-
dant were reconvicted on the same evidence, one would logically expect that a second appel-
late court would also view the verdict as contrary to the weight of evidence. Therefore, the
case would once again be remanded. Theoretically, the cycle would continue ad infinitum.
The majority, however, did not agree with this argument:
We do not join in the ... forecast that the granting of a new trial would doom
the defendant and the Govirnment to an infinite regression .... [11f a third
jury were to find [the defendant] guilty, we should suppose any judge would
hesitate a long time before concluding that the interests of justice required still
another trial.
Id. at 43 n.18 (quoting Unites States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 714 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972)). See also Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Woodson, 134
U.S. 614, 623 (1890) ("courts rarely grant a new trial after two verdicts upon the facts in
favor of the same party, except for error of law .... ").
55. On remand, the state of Florida dropped the charges against Delbert Tibbs because
it believed that the credibility of the rape victim had weakened. The author obtained this
information from a telephone conversation with Louis Beller, Attorney for Delbert Tibbs
(Sept. 19, 1983).
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ample, the demeanor of witnesses is different."" Undoubtedly,
factfinding is a dynamic and temporal process, and a second trial is
likely to add new life to any case.
The dissent was unwilling to permit a revitalized case on re-
trial. Its reluctance stemmed from the double jeopardy clause's
prohibition against retrial "for the purpose of affording the prose-
cution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding."5' In Green v. United States,5" the
Court emphasized the policy underlying the clause:
The underlying idea [of the double jeopardy clause] . . .is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an al-
leged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty."
The majority in Tibbs, however, refused to view a defendant
on remand as a target of government oppression. "An appellate
court's decision to give the defendant this second chance does not
create 'an unacceptably high risk that the government, with its su-
perior resources [will] wear down [the] defendant' and obtain con-
viction solely through its persistence."6 The majority viewed a
new trial as beneficial to the defendant-despite evidence suffi-
cient to support a conviction, the defendant is given another op-
portunity to win acquittal." Conversely, the dissent regarded a
new trial as unfair to the defendant because the prosecution, which
could not produce enough evidence to overcome reasonable doubt
in the first trial, now has a second chance to bolster its case.2
Concern for fairness to the defendant in a second trial has
prompted the suggestion that the state be excluded from introduc-
ing new evidence on retrial in its case in chief:
On a theoretical level, the prosecution need not adduce addi-
56. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 402 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Burks, 437 U.S. at 11.
58. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
59. Id. at 187-88.
60. 457 U.S. at 43 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980)). A
retrial after a reversed conviction based upon the weight of the evidence is another illustra-
tion of the balancing theory. Until a second verdict is rendered, the government's.interest in
a final adjudication of guilt or innocence is superior to the defendant's immediate interest in
finality. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
61. 457 U.S. at 43-44.
62. Id. at 49-50.
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tional evidence on retrial, as it already has introduced a legally
sufficient amount of evidence. On a practical level, however, the
prosecution has been alerted to the fact that its case is not solid.
The reversal will motivate the prosecution to uncover and pro-
duce more evidence and make a more effective presentation at
retrial. If the purpose in granting retrial is to "allow the defen-
dant a second chance," the prosecution should not be given an-
other chance to introduce evidence, because this is in contradic-
tion to the established policies supporting the protection against
double jeopardy."
This argument is circular. It supports the dissent's position
that a defendant's reconviction on retrial in the absence of new
evidence would be reversed again on appeal on the weight of evi-
dence. The interests of justice demand that both the government
and the defendant be allowed to strengthen their cases. The gov-
ernment's introduction of new evidence on retrial does not under-
mine the Green policy; it is the defendant who requested and re-
ceived another chance to win acquittal.
In addition to criticizing the sufficiency-weight distinction as
undermining the Green policy, the Tibbs dissent argued that the
distinction will also undermine the Burks rule64 by encouraging
judges to reverse on the basis of the weight rather than the suffi-
ciency of evidence. 6 This claim stems from a fear that appellate
judges will put the cart before the horse by first deciding whether a
retrial is necessary and later categorizing the reversal as based
upon the sufficiency of evidence or the weight of evidence. If that
assumption is accurate, our notions of judicial integrity are hollow
indeed.
The majority might have attacked the dissent's argument by
focusing on the fear of judicial misuse of the distinction. The dis-
sent feared that a judge having doubts about the sufficiency of evi-
dence might choose to reverse based upon the weight of evidence.
Obviously, the motive behind this decision would be to prevent a
defendant from being set free and to ensure a retrial. Without the
Tibbs sufficiency-weight distinction, however, a judge having
doubts about the adequacy of evidence might still prevent the de-
fendant from being set free by simply affirming the conviction. In
63. Note, Double Jeopardy: Retrial After Reversal of a Conviction on Evidentiary
Grounds, 42 LA. L. REv. 1061, 1075 (1983).
. 64. 457 U.S. at 51. Burks mandated acquittal when the evidence is legally insufficient to
justify conviction. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
65. See 457 U.S. at 51.
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this sense the sufficiency-weight distinction actually serves to pro-
tect defendants against unfair convictions.6
A more plausible criticism of Tibbs is not that judges will mis-
use the sufficiency-weight distinction, but rather that they will be
unable to make the distinction. Unfortunately, the majority cava-
lierly dismissed this argument as "unpersuasive. '' 67 The Court
stated that trial and appellate judges have regularly demonstrated
the ability to distinguish between the weight and the sufficiency of
evidence." This assertion gives the courts more credit than they
deserve, especially considering the Supreme Court's admission in
Burks of its own failure to distinguish between reversals based
upon trial error and those based upon the sufficiency of evidence."
The suggestion in Tibbs that lower courts will have no difficulty
distinguishing between reversals based upon the sufficiency of evi-
dence and those based upon the weight of evidence, a much more
subtle distinction, is overly optimistic. Indeed, the suggestion lacks
hindsight. The Court either overlooked or ignored the Florida Su-
preme Court's opinion in Tibbs I1,70 where the state supreme court
expressly acknowledged the failure of its lower courts to make the
distinction:
The district court in this case reviewed a number of Florida ap-
pellate decisions reversing convictions on the alleged basis of ev-
identiary weight. Although the court's analysis is plausible, we
prefer to view these ambiguous decisions as reversals which
were based on sufficiency; that is, as cases in which the state
failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.7 1
66. The majority noted that without the sufficiency-weight distinction, state legislators
might simply forbid appellate courts to reweigh the evidence and thereby "eliminate prac-
tices that help shield defendants from unjust convictions." Id. at 45 n.22.
67. Id. at 44.
68. See id.
69. See supra text accompanying note 33; see also Forman v. United States, 361 U.S.
416 (1960). Without distinguishing between a reversal based upon trial error and a reversal
based upon the sufficiency of evidence, the Forman Court held, "[i]t is elementary in our
law that a person can be tried a second time for an offense when his prior conviction for
that same offense has been set aside by his appeal." Therefore, "his plea of double jeopardy
must fail." Id. at 425.
70. 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
71. Id. at 1124 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted
the following cases as reversals based upon the sufficiency and not the weight of evidence:
Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (although there was some evidence to
support a conviction for rape the record as a whole was not conclusive); Sosa v. Maxwell,
234 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (state failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants committed murder); Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730,
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One might wonder why the sufficiency-weight distinction
would create such a problem. Ideally, a judge must first decide
whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
the verdict. If he concludes that there was sufficient evidence, the
judge must then decide whether the verdict was contrary to the
weight of evidence. Viewed as a simple two-step process, the suffi-
ciency-weight distinction does not appear to be a difficult concept:
the judge does not consider questions of weight until after deter-
mining if the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. How-
ever, the process is not that simple. A judge cannot be expected to
completely isolate his thoughts with respect to the two categories.
His ultimate decision about the weight of evidence will affect his
determination of the sufficiency of evidence. The more strongly a
judge believes that the verdict is contrary to the weight of evi-
dence, the more likely he is to reverse based upon the sufficiency of
evidence. For this reason, reversals based upon the weight of evi-
dence are rare.
Undoubtedly, many judges in the past have found themselves
tangled in the threadwork of the sufficiency-weight distinction.
Some of the confusion may be attributed to the fact that the im-
portance of the distinction was not clear until Tibbs. Tibbs has
alerted courts to the fact that they must concentrate on accurately
distinguishing the sufficiency from the weight of evidence. None-
theless, the line that separates the two categories is not always eas-
ily identified. Even competent judges will at times hesitate before
categorizing a reversal as based upon either the sufficiency or the
weight of evidence.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: THE COMMON LAW ROOTS OF THE
SUFFICIENCY-WEIGHT DISTINCTION
Although the Court did not rely on the early double jeopardy
case law, there is substantial support for its conclusion that an ap-
19 So. 2d 106 (1944) (state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had
had sexual intercourse with a minor); Woodward v. State, 133 Fla. 301, 151 So. 509 (1933)
(uncertainties in evidence prevented state from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had committed incest with his daughter); Skiff v. State, 107 Fla. 90, 144 So. 323
(1932) (court reversed a rape conviction because the prosecution's evidence was unconvinc-
ing); McNeil v. State, 104 Fla. 360, 139 So. 791 (1932) (court reversed a conviction for armed
robbery after finding that the evidence of defendant's identity as the guilty party was not
satisfactory); Fuller v. State, 92 Fla. 873, 110 So. 528 (1926) (evidence purporting to estab-
lish that defendant was guilty of homicide was not sufficient); Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138,
50 So. 749 (1909) (state failed to place defendants at the scene of the crime or to prove that
they fired any shots).
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pellate court may grant a new trial after reversing a conviction
based on a verdict contrary to the weight of evidence. English legal
history reveals that as early as the seventeenth century, a common
law judge could set aside a verdict and grant a new trial if he was
not satisfied with the results or if the verdict was contrary to the
weight of evidence.7 2 In the United States, courts have always fol-
lowed the English rule allowing judges to grant new trials on this
basis.7 ' In 1790, the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that whenever it appears "that actual and manifest injustice is
done, or that the jury have proceeded . . . contrary to strong evi-
dence .. . the Court will always give an opportunity, by a new
trial, of rectifying the mistakes of the former jury, and of doing
complete justice to the parties. 4
If a state allows its appellate courts to reweigh evidence, it
should also allow those courts to grant new trials when finding ver-
dicts contrary to the weight of evidence. Not all states, however,
grant their appellate courts the power to reweigh evidence. At the
time of Tibbs II, Florida permitted its appellate courts to reverse
convictions based upon the weight of evidence.7 5 Yet in that deci-
sion the Florida Supreme Court revoked the right of its appellate
tribunals to grant such reversals in the future. The paradox of the
court's decision is that in recognizing the reversal of Tibb's convic-
tion as one based upon the weight of evidence, the court simulta-
neously decided that Florida appellate courts may no longer re-
verse for that reason.7 6 By eliminating the third category of
reversal, the court stated that it was returning the state's appellate
courts to their proper role of examining the sufficiency of evidence
72. In 1665, an English court granted a new trial to remedy mistakes of the jury. W.
FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1852). Chief Justice Holt believed that courts had
granted new trials even before that date. Id. at 186 n.2.
73. In Metropolitan R.R. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558 (1887), the Court stated that the trial
judge had a "duty" to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial when the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 570.
In Mt. Adams & E.P. Inclined Ry. v. Lowery, 74 F. 463 (6th Cir. 1896), the court stated:
"the rule in the American courts seems to be that, if the verdict be clearly and manifestly
against the evidence or the weight of evidence, a new trial should be granted." Id. at 472
(citations omitted).
Later, the fourth circuit stated: "[I]t is the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial if he is of opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of justice
.... " Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 352 (4th Cir. 1941).
74. Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 55, 56 (1790) (emphasis added).
75. See 457 U.S. at 38 n.12.
76. 397 So. 2d at 1125.
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and leaving questions of weight for the jury." The court's rationale
arises from the assumption that a judge granting a new trial acts in
derogation of the defendant's right to trial by jury. That assump-
tion is not accurate. A jury cannot function without the assistance
of the judge. "They Uurors] are not, and have never been, indepen-
dent of the court . . . their verdicts must meet the approval, or at
least they must not offend the sense of justice, of the presiding
judge, who [is] by virtue of his position 'the thirteenth juror.'-78
In light of the unity of function between the judge and jury,
the right to trial by jury is strengthened, not weakened, when the
court exercises its discretionary power to grant a new trial. When
ruling that a verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence, the
judge does not invade the province of the jury; he simply transfers
the defendant from the province of an unfair or inept jury to the
province of a new jury. Even in the absence of intentional miscon-
duct, many factors might cause a jury to render a faulty verdict.
For example, the jurors might be inadvertently exposed to media
coverage and thereby prejudiced; or they might be confused by the
complexity of the jury instructions; or they might mistakenly ex-
amine legal issues as well as factual issues and draw conclusions
that are contrary to law. If these facts are known to exist, then a
conviction might be reversed on the basis of trial error. But it is
quite possible that the existence of any single factor cannot be
proved. In this situation, it is the duty of the trial judge to discard
the unjust verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence. If he
fails to do so, then the appellate court must reverse and remand
the case for a new trial.
77. Id.
78. Smith v. Times Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481, 497, 36 A. 296, 309 (1897) (Williams, J.,
concurring). Judge Williams traced the history of the judge's power to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial. Originally, Judge Williams explained, a defendant injured by a false
verdict had only one means of redress: he could take action directly against the jury. This
method proved circuitous and inadequate. Later, judges were allowed to assess fines against
jurors for unjust verdicts on the theory that the jurors had been negligent. This practice,
however, did not help the injured defendant. Finally, in the 1600's, judges adopted a more
direct method of correcting unjust verdicts by setting them aside and granting new trials.
According to Judge Williams, the reason for this new practice was simple: "As it had been
within the undoubted discretion of the judges to fine and imprison jurors for a false verdict,
a fortiori it was within their discretionary power to set the false verdict aside, and so relieve
against the injustice done by it." Id. at 508, 36 A. at 308.
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V. ELIMINATION OF "WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE" REVERSALS IN
FLORIDA
The Florida Supreme Court's position is that although it is
proper for the trial judge to exercise a broad discretionary power to
reweigh the evidence, set aside the verdict, and grant a new trial, it
is not appropriate for an appellate judge to exercise that same
power. The justification for allowing a trial judge to set aside a
verdict is his firsthand exposure to the witnesses and their testi-
mony, an opportunity the appellate judge does not have.7 9 None-
theless, the lack of firsthand exposure to the trial should not pre-
clude an appellate court's reversal based upon the weight of
evidence.
The primary function of an appellate court is to determine if
the interests of justice require a new trial. The interests of justice
demand not only sufficient evidence but also a judge's determina-
tion that the prosecution's testimony was more reliable than that
of the defendant. If the court decides that the prosecution's testi-
mony was not more reliable, it must conclude that the verdict was
contrary to the weight of evidence. Therefore, it appears that a re-
versal based upon the weight of evidence is, at the same time, a
reversal based upon the interests of justice. Yet, in ruling that its
appellate courts may no longer reverse based upon the weight of
evidence, the Florida Supreme Court stated, "By eliminating evi-
dentiary weight as a ground for appellate reversal, we do not mean
to imply that an appellate court cannot reverse a judgment or con-
viction 'in the interest[s] of justice.' The latter has long been, and
still remains, a viable and independent ground for appellate
reversal. ' 's
The problem with the Florida Supreme Court's analysis is that
a reversal based upon the interests of justice will often result from
a conclusion drawn from the weight of evidence. Conversely, many
reversals based upon the weight of evidence are phrased in terms
of the interests of justice.81 Therefore, the distinction between evi-
dentiary reversals"' based upon the weight of evidence and those
79. Metropolitan R.R. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 572-73 (1887).
80. 397 So. 2d at 1126. The court cited Rule 9.140(f) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure (1977), which provides: "In capital cases, the court shall review the evidence to
determine if the interest of justice requires a new trial .... ." Id.
81. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
82. Outside the scope of evidentiary shortcomings, appellate courts have used the inter-
ests of justice reversal to correct fundamental errors that occurred at trial. See, e.g., Wright
v. State, 348 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (error to admit testimony of unqualified medical
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based upon the interests of justice is illusory.
The Florida Supreme Court's review of Tibb's conviction dem-
onstrates the problem. The court stated, "[Ilt is our obligation to
review a conviction for which the death sentence has been imposed
to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial."83 The
court then analyzed the severe weaknesses84 in the prosecution's
case (i.e., reweighed the evidence) and concluded, "[riather than
risk the very real possibility that Tibbs had nothing to do with
these crimes, we reverse his conviction [based upon the weight of
evidence] and remand for a new trial." 85 If the court had not re-
versed Tibb's conviction based upon the weight of evidence, it
probably would have reversed his conviction based upon the inter-
ests of justice. In this sense, the distinction between evidentiary
reversals based upon the weight of evidence and those based upon
the interests of justice is a semantical peculiarity.
If, on the other hand, the distinction has any merit, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court could be forced to affirm the death sentence
conviction of a defendant who is the victim of an unjust verdict.
For example, if the prohibition of weight of evidence reversals in
Tibbs 1186 did not apply prospectively, the Florida Supreme Court
would have been forced to reverse its decision in Tibbs IP7 despite
its conclusion in Tibbs II that Tibbs was very likely innocent. One
might assume that the court would nonetheless reverse the convic-
tion in the interests of justice. However, strict adherence to its rule
against reweighing evidence would preclude reversal in the inter-
ests of justice because that conclusion could only be reached after
the court has reweighed the evidence.
To prevent this injustice, it is suggested that all states should
allow their appellate courts to reweigh evidence.88 An appellate
court's power to do so is a necessary safeguard to the integrity of
our jury system. Defendants must be protected from unfair jury
verdicts whether that protection is afforded by the trial court or
examiner); In re Tierney, 328 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (news reporter held in con-
tempt for failure to answer grand jury questions erroneously held in contempt again for
subsequent refusal to answer same questions); Cleveland v. State, 287 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1973) (error in unauthorized and improper sentencing provision).
83. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, .790 (emphasis added).
84. See supra note 21.
85. 337 So. 2d at 791.
86. 397 So. 2d 1120.
87. 337 So. 2d 788.
88. In one sense, all states do allow their appellate courts to reweigh evidence. Even in
Florida, an appellate court must reweigh evidence to determine if trial error was harmless or
prejudicial.
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the appellate court. And where either court finds a verdict contrary
to the weight of evidence, the defendant must be placed in the
province of a new jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the trial level, the sufficiency-weight distinction has existed
for hundreds of years. In Tibbs, the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized that the sufficiency-weight distinction is also a
viable tool for appellate review. Although the Court did not refer
to early American case law, our jurisprudential heritage has long
recognized that appellate reversals, based upon either the suffi-
ciency or the weight of evidence, protect the defendant against un-
fair jury verdicts." And just as the trial court may grant a new
trial when the verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence, an ap-
pellate court should also be allowed to do so.
The critical factor in the exercise of this broad discretionary
power is that judges must accurately distinguish between the suffi-
ciency and weight of evidence. The majority's utmost confidence in
the ability of judges to apply the distinction results from an over-
simplification of a complex issue. Although the ramifications of the
Tibbs decision are not yet clear, 90 the grave nature of the suffi-
ciency-weight distinction is suggested by the fact that, to men like
Delbert Tibbs, it could mean the difference between life and death.
MICHAEL SEWARD
89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, Tibbs may apply retroactively. In
Carter v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 77, modifying 677 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1982), the fifth circuit de-
clared: "For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that since Burks applies
retroactively, so does Tibbs." 691 F.2d at 778 n.2. Therefore, an inevitable consequence of
Tibbs may be that unsuccessful prosecutors will attempt to convince appellate courts that
previous reversals allegedly based on sufficiency were actually based on weight. Prosecutors
would gain that "second bite of the apple." In Carter, however, the prosecutor was unsuc-
cessful - the court held: "The inescapable conclusion is that the reversal [of Carter's con-
viction for embezzlement] was based upon a perceived evidentiary insufficiency and not a
reweighing of the evidence . . . ." Id. at 781.
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